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Abstract
We examine, in a network market open to competition, various mechanisms of
allocating and funding "universal service obligations" among agents (rival opera-
tors and consumers). The obligations we consider are geographic ubiquity and non
discrimination. We analyze from eciency and equity point of view the respective
advantages of a "restricted-entry" system (where the entrant is not allowed to serve
high cost consumers) and the "pay or play" system at work for instance in Australia.
We show that the pay or play regulation always dominates the restricted-entry regu-
lation under ubiquity constraint alone. This result no longer holds when the regulator
imposes also the non discrimination constraint.
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11 Introduction
The transition towards a more competitive regime on the markets of public utilities rises a
number of new questions. In network utilities like telecommunications, electricity, gaz, the
regulator often values an "equal access" of all consumers to the service at an "aordable
tari"1. Whereas networks were previously operated by monopolies who were in charge
with these universal service obligations (USOs), and used cross-subsidies between "prof-
itable" and "unprotable" users, the arrival of new entrants on markets that are now open
to competition induces cream skimming on protable segments of the market (see Laont
and Tirole (1998)), and makes previous monopolies unable to nance these obligations
through cross-subsidies2. Moreover, competition leads to outcomes that are not neces-
sarily desirable from the regulator's point of view. Without regulatory constraints, some
users would then be excluded of the market, and users with dierent consumption or costs
characteristics would face dierent taris. If the regulator values equality with respect to
taris and/or access of all the users to the market, he must then impose "universal service
obligations" (USOs). In practice, those obligations include two types of components. The
"social" component includes the fact that light users should be oered taris similar to
heavy users, or low taris for targeted consumers (see Gasmi, Laont, Sharkey (1999)).
The "geographical" component can be divided into two obligations: ubiquity and non dis-
crimination. The "ubiquity constraint" states that all consumers should be connected to
a network, whatever their location. The "non discrimination" constraint states that the
same tari should be proposed to all those consumers, whatever their location or their
connection cost. These constraints may be imposed together or independently3. Those
constraints are particularly relevant in developed countries for promoting access of a large
number of consumers to new technologies, like Internet. In developing countries, and par-
ticularly in case of privatization, those constraints are crucial to ensure a large development
of networks.
The universal service obligations raise two series of questions. First, which USO's should
be imposed to whom (the allocation problem) and second, who should pay for the USO's
(the funding problem). The combination of various solutions to the rst and to the second
question dene dierent regulatory mechanisms that have dierent implications in terms of
global and/or partial surplus. Compared to an unconstrained competition between network
providers, universal service obligations induce distortions on the competitive entry process
and on the equilibrium market structure. Those distortion generate both social benets
and social costs. The question of how to share these costs and benets becomes one of the
1See e.g., Federal Communications Commission, "In the matter of Federal-Sate Joint Board on Universal
Service", CC Docket, n 96-45, Nov. 8, 1996.
2For a complete theory of competition in the sectors of public utilities, see Laont and Tirole (1993).
3For instance in France, the provision of gas is not submitted to the ubiquity constraint: the operator
Gaz De France may choose not to serve a given area. But when it serves it, it is submitted to a non
discrimination constraint, that is, it must oer the same tari (or the same menu) to any consumer of the
areas that are served.
2main questions for regulators and has received various answers in dierent countries.
The main tasks for regulators consist in determining optimal rules for allocating and
funding those USOs. On the allocation side, two alternative approachs exist, depending on
who between the incumbent and its competitors incur USOs. In most countries, following
openess to competition, only the incumbent is in charge of USOs. In certain cases, pro-
ductive eciency would require that competitors incur some of the USOs. For instance,
USOs can be auctionned (see Milgrom (1996), Weller (1998))4. On the funding side, three
methods exist. Most systems share the property that they have to be self funded. The cost
of the USOs is then nanced through taxes, levied on all units of goods. An alternative
method consists in nancing USOs through lump sum transfers. Finally, probably the less
distorting scheme consists in funding USOs through cross-subsidies.
In this paper, we focus mainly on two allocation mechanisms and funding systems. The
"restricted-entry" rule gives to the incumbent the obligation of serving non protable users
at the same tari as protable ones, whereas the pay or play regulation5 allows the entrant
to serve the market. On the funding side, both rules allow for cross-subsidies and taxation.
We compare them from a global and partial surplus point of view. In the last section of
the paper, we briey discuss other possibilities, like auctions on the allocations side and
lump sum transfers on the funding side.
We examine various procedures of tax determination. Among others, we analyze the
case where the tax is designed to be "competitively neutral", that is, the incumbent must
obtain through taxes, if it is possible, the same amount of prots than under a competitive
regime. This view corresponds to that developped in the US in the Telecommunication
Act of 19966. However, it diers greatly from a determination of taxes through a rst
best principle, and thus induces social losses. An important remark is thus that the "cost
of universal service" is conditionnal to the way it is funded. As pointed out by Panzar
(1999), 'any USO costing exercise must begin with a careful specication of an unsubsidized
market scenario that would prevail in the absence of the USO'. Many proposed measures
of USO costs (in particular the accountable approach of 'net avoidable costs'7) ignore this
basic requirement. In this paper, we dene precisely the benchmark situation, where no
USO is imposed, and then we carefully list and evaluate the economic distortions due to
the presence of the tax. In our framework, the market structure as well as the cost of the
USO's are endogeneous, since they depend on the regulation rule and the tax determination
procedure.
We build a model where two operators compete for a market of a network good. Con-
sumers are heterogenous with respect to their connection costs. The regulator imposes
dierent combinations of USOs, and funds them through taxes. The incumbent rm is
4For instance, USOs are auctionned for the postal service in Germany or for telecommunications in the
US (and more recently in Germany and Austria).
5The pay or play regualtion is applied in Australia and has been discussed in UK in the telecommuni-
cation sector.
6See Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (1996 Act), 47 U.S.C. 254(b).
7See for instance WIK (1997).
3in charge with the USOs. We then compare two regulatory mechanisms. In the "pay or
play" system, the entrant may choose to serve the non protable users, whereas in the
"restricted-entry" system, he is not allowed to. We examine the equilibria of the corre-
sponding games, and compare them in terms of social welfare and in terms of transfers
between agents. In a last section, we compare the funding of USOs through taxation with
the case lump sum transfer scheme. Finally, we compare these two regulatory mechanisms
with a second price auction on the market of non protable users.
2 Model and notations
2.1 The framework
We consider the following situation. Two rms, denoted I and E; compete for the market
of a network good. This network has a character of public utility, that is, the public
authority may pursue social objectives such as "equal access" of all the consumers to the
service provided by the network. Typically, this situation reects liberalization of a network
market, such as electricity, gaz, telecommunications or airlines, where an incumbent rm
(I) faces a entrant (E).
There are two types of users denoted by  = ;: The type of a user corresponds to its
location across the geographical space: the value  =  (resp.  = ) denotes a location
where the cost of connection to the network is low (resp. high). For instance  is a measure
of the cost of connection in high density areas (urban areas), whereas  corresponds to
low density areas (rural areas). The proportion of consumers of type  is  and that of
consumers  is .
A consumer who buys q units of the good and who is charged a tari T(q)8 receives
a net surplus equal to: u = w(q)   T(q), where w(q) is supposed to be increasing and
concave. Here, the only element of heterogeneity concerns the connection costs. The
demand addressed to rm K by a consumer facing the tari T(q) is given by w0(q) = T 0(q):
One should note that the demand of a particular consumer is independant of its connection
cost.
Firms are endowed with the following technologies. Firm K = I;E incurs a cost
CK(q;), when providing q units to consumer  = ;  . We assume that
CK(q;) < CK(q;  )
for all q and for both rms K = I;E. If the consumers  and   are respectively urban
and rural users, this assumption expresses the fact that connecting rural users to the
network is more costly to any rm than connecting urban users, whatever the level of their
consumption9. The prot of rm K is then K(q;) = TK(q;)   CK(q;):
8Under the assumption of homogeneous preferences, a two-part tari allows to achieve the same allo-
cation than more general non linear taris. In a more general model, consumers could be heterogenous in
their tastes for the good.
9In order to focus on questions related to universal service obligations, we do not consider any problem of
4Remark 1 It is equivalent to work with tari variables T(;q) or with variables u and
q; where u denotes the utility level oered to a consumer. We deal thereafter with (u;q):
We denote by uK (respectively uK) the utility oered by rm K to consumers of type 
(respectively ):
Remark 2 The surplus derived from the relationship between a consumer of type  and
rm K is SK(;q) = w(q)   TK(q;) + K(;q) = w(q)   CK(q;):
The rst best quantity is dened by qFB
K = argmaxq0SK(;q): The rst best surplus
is SK() = w(qFB)   CK(qFB;) if qFB
K > 0: This value SK() is the value to be shared
between the rm and the consumer, the share of the consumer being uK. For simplicity,
we note  SK = SK() and SK = SK().
We shall maintain the following assumption throughout10:
max( SI;  SE) < 0 < min(SI;SE); (1)
which means that high cost consumers are not protable and would not be served by any
rm without universal service obligations.
2.2 Benchmark: The competitive case
As a benchmark, we study the case where no rm is submitted to any USO constraint, that
is, each rm K is able to oer a perfectly discriminatory tari to any consumer. Because
of our assumption (1), rms then compete on user  only. The prot of rm E is given by:
E(uE;qE) =

(SE(q)   uE) if uE > uI
0 if uE < uI:
The prot of rm I has a symmetric expression. It is clear that we have qK = qFB
K when
the consumer is served by rm K: Therefore in what follows, we will call "strategies" the
choices of the variable uK by rm K = I;E:
Each rm reacts to the strategy of its rival by choosing the share of the surplus it leaves
to the consumer. We can then compute the best reply function of rm E in response to
the strategy uI of rm I:
Facing uI, rm E can oer uI +" if E = SE  uI  " remains positive, that is, as long
as uI < SE: If uI > SE, rm E has no incentive to be active. Thus the best reply function
of E to uI is given by:
uE(uI) =

uI if uI < SE
any value in [0;uI[ if uI > SE:
interconnection between both networks, which amounts to assume that the interconnection charge between
networks is zero. For more details on the interconnection problems, see Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers
(1996).
10except in section A.6, where we relax this assumption, in order to study the impact of imposing a non
discrimination constraint alone.
5In what follows, we will use as a benchmark the sequential game in which rm I is
the leader. This representation of the competition process suits better to the case where a
(dominant) incumbent faces a new entrant. Finally, as we will see in the next section, the
allocation of universal service obligations gives to the incumbent a rst mover advantage.
The sequential game (where rm I acts as a leader) may lead to a continuum of subgame
perfect equilibria (SPE). When 0 < SI < SE, any value uI 2 [0;SE] leads to the same prot
for the rm I, namely I = 0 since E serves the consumer).
Lemma 1 The subgame perfect equilibria of the game where rm I acts as a leader are
dened as follows:
 if 0 < SE < SI, there is a unique SPE: rm I serves the consumer, oers him
uI = SE and q
I = qFB
I , and makes prot I = SI   SE;
 if 0 < SI < SE, there is a continuum of SPE, parametrized by uE 2 [0;SE]: rm E
serves the consumer, who obtains any value uE 2 [0;SE]. Firm E gets E = SE  uE
and rm I stays out of the market.
2.3 Taxes and distortions
In what follows, we will often consider the case where rm E pays a tax t on each unit sold
to consumer . We now state a few useful results concerning the surplus of the relationship
between rm E and the consumer , in presence of the tax t. In the sequel, the presence
of a tilda indicates the dependance of the variable with regard to the tax rate t.
Let T(q) be the tari posted by the rm and q be the quantity of good purchased by
the consumer . The prot of the rm writes:
e E = T(q)   CE(q;)   tq;
where t is the tax level. We denote ~ SE the surplus from the relationship between E and 
~ SE(t;q) = e E + w(q)   T(q) = w(q)   CE(q;)   tq:
Let ~ SE(t) be the maximum value over q  0 of the surplus:
~ SE(t) = max
q0
fw(q)   CE(q;)   tqg:
Let ~ qE be the value of q for which the maximum is attained. The following lemma is proved
in the appendix (section A.1).
Lemma 2 The following properties are true:
1. The total surplus function ~ SE is convex;
2. The functions ~ SE and ~ SE + t~ qE are nonincreasing with respect to t;
63. There exists a tax level te such that for t  te; rm E can extract no surplus from
consumers : ~ SE(te) = 0.
The sum ~ SE(t) + t~ qE(t) represents the total amount that can be extracted from the
relation between E and the consumer ; that is, the whole amount of what the rm E and
the consumer  receive on the one hand, ~ SE(t), and the amount of tax collected on the
other hand t~ qE. The higher the tax, the lower this total amount. This partial eect should
lead the regulator to choose not too high taxes.
Lemma 2 shows that the entrant is only active on the market when the tax level is not
too high (t < te). Very high level of taxes eject rm E from the competition with rm I.
2.4 Denitions of and interactions between USOs
The Universal Service Obligations consist in two dierent constraints imposed by the reg-
ulator to the incumbent I:
 Ubiquity constraint (subscript U will identify thereafter the variables under this
constraint): Each consumer should have access to the good, that is, each consumer
must face a tari such that he obtains a nonnegative level of utility;
 Non discrimination constraint (ND): If the incumbent chooses to serve both types of
consumers, it must oer the same tari to both. The incumbent may prefer to serve
only one type;
 Ubiquity and non discrimination constraints (UND): the incumbent must oer to all
consumers the same tari and this tari must be such that all the consumers have a
nonnegative utility level.
Recall that we model the competition between rms I and E by a sequential game,
where rm I is the leader: whatever the regulation framework, rm I rst announces a
pair (uI;  uI). The USO's may thus be represented by constraints on the space of strategies
of the incumbent:
USO=U : uI  0;  uI  0
USO=ND : if uI  0;  uI  0 then uI =  uI
USO=UND : uI =  uI  0:
Note, however, that these restrictions on I's strategies imply (at equilibrium) restrictions
on E's strategies. Suppose for example that under USO=UND, rm E serves all the
consumers. Then, it is clear that the consumers  and   get the same level of utility at
equilibrium (uE =  uE).
Imposing ND alone may lead to some paradoxical eects. It may happen that with
no constraint, the incumbent would have served both types of consumers, but submitted
to the ND constraint, it stops serving type  consumers. Therefore, a constraint U may
be required together with ND in order to make ND eective (see section A.6 for more
details). In this paper, we focus on constraints U and UND.
72.5 Regulatory rules
The purpose of the paper is to examine the consequences on consumer's surplus, on prots
and on global surplus, of dierent ways of allocating and funding the USOs (U or UND). We
consider essentially two regulatory frameworks, denoted by "restricted-entry regulation"
and "pay or play regulation".
Whatever the regulatory mechanism, the timing of the game is the following. The
regulator rst announces the level of the tax t paid on each unit of the good. It also
announces that at the end of the game the amount of tax collected will be allocated to
the incumbent, if it serves the high cost consumer 11. Then rms compete, that is, they
choose the share of the surplus they will leave to consumers, the tax rate being taken as
exogenous.
2.5.1 The various regimes
As we will see further, the regulatory rules may lead at equilibrium to one of the four
following situations:
 Firm I serves both types of consumers, and cross-subsidizes between them. We call
this regime "I cross-subsidizes" (ICS). No tax is raised nor perceived;
 Firm E serves both types of consumers, and cross-subsidizes between them; we call
this regime "E cross-subsidizes" (ECS). No tax is raised nor perceived;
 Firm I serves the high costs consumers, E serves the low cost consumers and pays a
tax; we call this situation the "taxation regime" (TR);
 High costs consumers are excluded from the consumption of the good, low cost con-
sumers being served by either of the two rms; we call this regime "exclusion regime"
(ER).
2.5.2 'Restricted-entry' regulation versus 'pay or play' regulation
Under the 'restricted-entry' regulation, rm E is not allowed to serve high cost consumers
 . Under USO=U or UND, these consumers are served by the incumbent. Two regimes
may occur: ICS and TR.
Under the 'pay or play' regulation (POP), rm E is allowed to serve consumer  . When
E chooses to serve  , it does not pay nor receive any tax. Therefore, rms' payos are not
symmetric12. Under the 'play or pay' regulation, the identity of the rm who serves   is
endogeneously determined. Three regimes may occur: ICS, TR, and ECS.
11If the incumbent serves both types of consumers, it pays the tax but then it also receives the amount
of the tax; it is thus neutral for its prot.
12By contrast, auction mechanisms generally lead to symmetric payos (see for example Anton and alii
[1]).
8Under the restricted-entry regulation , rm E's strategy reduces to the choice of uE.
Under the POP regulation, rm E may in addition choose to serve  consumers and thus
also chooses  uE.
2.5.3 The choice of the tax level
The choice of the tax level depends on the objectives pursued by the regulator. We focus
here on three particular procedures: the rst best tax, the balanced-budget tax and the
competitively neutral tax.
The rst best tax is the level of tax that maximizes the social welfare. However, this
rst best level may lead to a loss in prot for the incumbent.
Therefore, we introduce a second-best tax, namely the balanced-budget tax, dened by




We also analyse the "competitively neutral" tax, where rm I is compensated and receives,
when it is possible, the prot of the benchmark case. Let e USO
K be the prot of rm K at
the equilibrium of this competitive process with tax, when the set of obligations is USO=U
or UND. Under competitive neutrality, the tax rate tUSO is determined by the equality
e 
USO
I = I ( "competitive neutrality condition")
The idea of competitive neutrality is that the funding and the presence of USOs are de-
signed not to aect the prot of rm I with respect to the unconstrained situation (bench-
mark)13.
Budget balance and competitive neutrality may or may not coincide, according on what
happens in the benchmark case.
2.6 Welfare criteria and productive eciency
Generally, USOs are imposed in a purpose of enhancing the situation of unfavored con-
sumers (by the constraint U) or to achieve equity objectives (by the constraint ND). In
our model, "unfavored" consumers correspond to high connection cost consumers (the 
type). We assume that the public authority values by itself the access to the network of
all consumers and denote by k the valuation of the access by the regulator. The welfares
in the dierent regimes are
WII = SI + SI + k in the ICS regime
WEE = SE + SE + k in the ECS regime
f WEI = (e SE + te qE) + SI + k in the taxation regime
WEI = SE + SI + k in the taxation regime with t = 0
WK0 = SK + k in the exclusion regime (rm K serves):
13Firstly, remark that the competitive neutrality tax depends on the endogeneous market structure when
USOs are imposed. Secondly, this criteria compensates perfectly the rm who incurs USOs but not its
competitors.
9In the benchmark case analysed above, and under our assuption SK < 0; the welfare is
thus WI0 or WE0 according to which rm is the most ecient on the market of low costs
consumers. The following remark follows readily from Lemma 2.
Remark 3 The welfare in the taxation regime f WEI is nonincreasing with respect to the
tax level t.
Let W be the value of the global welfare at the competitive equilibrium, and f W USO(t)
the value of the global welfare at equilibrium with USO and tax. Then the dierence
W USO = f W USO(t)   W, that may be positive or negative, measures the variation of
welfare due to the USO constraint. The variations of the global welfare may be decomposed
into individual contributions, which allows to evaluate the transfers associated with a
particular regime. Both constraints also induce welfare losses. According to the way
USOs are attributed and funded, these losses may be incurred by rms and/or by  type
consumers. As a whole, the global welfare may increase or decrease, according to which
partial eect dominates. Moreover, the two systems that we examine may lead to opposite
conclusions. An interesting question is to compare the welfares under the restricted-entry
and the pay or play regulation.
3 The restricted-entry regulation: Firm I serves high
cost consumers
Recall that under the restricted-entry rule, the USOs are imposed to the incumbent (rm
I) and that the entrant (rm E) cannot choose to serve the consumers relevant for the USO
instead of paying the tax. We consider successively the cases where the USO is restricted to
U only, and dened by UND. We derive rst the equilibria of the game, identify thereafter
the possible ineciencies generated by the situation and proceed nally with the welfare
and redistribution analysis.
3.1 Equilibria of the competition process under USOs
The constraints U and UND that the regulator can impose on rm I have dierent conse-
quences on the equilibrium congurations and on their welfare implications. We examine
successively these various constraints. Recall that we restrict ourselves to the case where
 SI < 0 and  SE < 0:
3.1.1 Equilibria under ubiquity constraint alone
As explained in the introduction, the competition process (for a given tax level t) is mod-
elled by a sequential game, where the incumbent acts as a leader: rm I announces two
values uI and  uI such that: uI  0 and  uI  0 (ubiquity constraint). Since rm E is not
10allowed to serve consumer  , we have clearly:  uI = 0. Firm E's prot function is
e E =

0 in the ICS regime
(~ SE   uI) in the taxation regime:
Firm E chooses to serve  if and only if uI < ~ SE. Therefore the announcement of uI
determines the regime that will prevail: uI < ~ SE leads to the taxation regime, uI > ~ SE
leads to the ICS regime. Firm I's prot function is then given by
e I =

(SI   uI) +   SI if uI > ~ SE ICS regime
t~ qE +   SI if uI < ~ SE taxation regime
Then the strategy of the incumbent reduces to the choice of the regime: In the taxation
regime, rm I's prot does not depend on 0  uI < ~ SE (which leads to a multiplicity of
equilibria); in the ICS regime, rm I's optimal announcement is of course uI = ~ SE. Then
rm I has to compare the corresponding values of its prot. We have:
e I = max

(SI   ~ SE) +   SI;t~ qE +   SI

:
In all the sequel, we will express the prots of rm I in the dierent regimes in terms of
the corresponding welfares. We can rewrite e I as
e I = max

WII   k   ~ SE;f WEI   k   ~ SE

:
Up to a constant (~ SE + k), the prots of I in the regimes ICS and TR coincide with the
corresponding welfares WII and f WEI. We introduce the following convention to express
the fact that rm I's compares the quantities WII and f WEI when choosing the regime:
e I = max(WII;f WEI):
The notation e I denotes the prot of I (in presence of the tax t) in the regimes ICS and
TR up to a constant. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Restricted-entry regulation, USO=U) For any level of the tax, the
perfect subgame equilibria lead to the regime associated to the highest value of the welfare:
Firm I chooses the taxation regime when f WEI > WII and it chooses to cross-subsidize
when WII > f WEI.
It is interesting to note that since the regulator can transfer its objective to the in-
cumbent, the restricted-entry regulation avoids incentives problems that could appear due
to informational asymmetries between parties: even if the regulator observes neither the
costs of the rms nor the consumers' characteristics, delegation to the incumbent of the
ubiquity constraint solves the adverse selection problems associated with unobservability
of the rms' and the consumers' characteristics14.
14However, second price auctions would also solve such informational problems.
11By Lemma 2, the fonction f WEI decreases with t. Then if WEI = f WEI(0) < WII, we
have: f WEI(t) < WII for all t  0 and the ICS regime occurs for all tax level. If WEI  WII,
there exists a tax level U such that
f WEI(
U) = WII:
The taxation regime occurs for t  U and the ICS regime occurs for t > U. It is intuitive
that when the tax rate is high, the entrant prefers to stay out of the market. A given level
of tax generates a given level of the sum ~ SE + t~ qE; which measures the "eciency" of the
relationship between E and the  consumer, conditionnally to t: Recall that this quantity
is a decreasing function of t:
The following result gives the consumers' surpluses in the dierent regimes.
Corollary 1 (SPE in the restricted-entry game, USO=U) In both regimes, the con-
sumer   gets  u = 0. The utility of consumer  depends on the regime:
u =

uI = ~ SE in the ICS regime
uE 2 [0; ~ SE] in the taxation regime.
The cross-subsidy regime corresponds to a situation where I is relatively more ecient
on the market of low cost consumers than E when the latter is submitted to the tax. In
this case, I announces for both types of consumers values that E cannot match because the
tax is too high (and thus the quantity ~ SE+t~ qE is too small). Therefore, I serves both types
of consumers and cross-subsidizes between them (that is, I nances the decit created by
the constraint U on high costs consumers by a transfer levied on low cost consumers).
In the taxation regime, by contrast, the sum of the surplus generated by the relationship
between E and  and of the amount of taxes collected is suciently high to allow both
rms to be active, each of them serving a dierent segment of the market. In this regime,
there are multiple equilibria15 which can only be selected by an additionnal criterion: a
criterion of dominance for rms would imply u = 0; whereas if there would exist a second
entrant, competition on the  would lead to u = ~ SE: An important consequence of this
result is the following.
Under ubiquity, a criterion of 'pure' productive eciency would consist in the compari-
son of WII an WEI. By Proposition 1, we know that rm I compares WII and f WEI. Since
f WEI < WEI, it follows that the ICS regime is "too often" implemented with regard to
'pure' productive eciency.
However, a reasonable criterion of productive eciency should take into account the fact
that ubiquity is funded through taxes. If we dene productive eciency as the comparison
between WII and f WEI, we see that the delegation of the regulator's objective function to
rm I allows to choose the socially preferred regime.
15If we had used a simultaneous game instead of a sequential game, the equilibrium would have been
unique. Note, however, that a Nash equilibrium may fail to exist when the regulator imposes also the non
discrimination constraint.
12In addition, a tax level equal to 0 allows to achieve pure productive eciency. A zero
tax, however, may fulll neither of the tax constraints (budget balance of the incumbent
or competitive neutrality).
3.1.2 Equilibria of the restricted-entry game with non discrimination con-
straint
The regulator imposes that each consumer receives the same nonnegative surplus. This
constraint is implemented by restricting the space of strategies of the incumbent (uI =
 uI  0). The proof of the following can be found in appendix (section A.2).
Proposition 2 (Restricted-entry regulation, USO=UND) Firm I's prot is given,
up to a constant, by
e I  max(WII    ~ SE;f WEI):
By contrast with the case USO=U (see Proposition 1), the prot of the incumbent does
not coincide with the welfares in the regimes ICS and TR. Under UND, the choice of the
incumbent diers from that of the regulator (for any given tax level t).
By Lemma 2, the function f WEI +  ~ SE is decreasing with respect to t. Let UND be the
value of the tax for which
f WEI(
UND) = WII   ~ SE(
UND):
It is worth noting that UND  U. We have the following
Corollary 2 (SPE in the restricted-entry game, USO=UND) The ICS regime oc-
curs if and only if
f WEI  WII    ~ SE or, equivalently t  
UND:
The taxation regime can occur only if SE > SI. In that case, it appears when 0  t <
UND. Consumers' surplus depends on the regime:
 cross-subsidy regime (ICS): uI = uI = uI = ~ SE;
 Taxation regime (TR): u = u = 0.
Recall that we have identied a rst distortion due to the tax: Under USO=U, rm I
compares WII and f WEI, instead of WII and WEI. The tax distortion WEI   f WEI implies
that the ICS regime is too often implemented.
Proposition 2 brings out an additional distortion under USO=UND, coming from the
fact that under UND rm I has to leave ~ SE to the  consumers. The distortion  ~ SE
has the opposite impact: compared to productive eciency, rm I chooses for too large
a set of parameters to remain in the taxation regime, instead of choosing the ICS regime
13(UND  U). The ND constraint softens the competition: since the incumbent has to
leave the same utility to both consumers, it is less agressive on the low cost consumers'
market16. By contrast, the taxation regime allows the incumbent to leave a zero utility to
high costs consumers.
The distortion due to ND appears particularly clearly in the following case. Suppose
that rm I is more ecient on both markets of consumers  and  (0 < SE < SI and
SE < SI < 0, so that WII > WEI): When ubiquity (U) alone is at work, rm I serves
 and  (cross-subsidy regime). Under UND, however, rm E serves  if and only if the
condition
WEI < WII < f WEI +  ~ SE
is satised. This condition expresses the fact that the ND distortion ( ~ SE) dominates the
tax distortion (WEI  f WEI). In that case, rm E is active on the market whereas I is more
ecient.
We now can analyse the welfare and redistributive implications of imposing USOs
depending on their funding is realized through cross-subsidies or through taxation.
3.2 Welfare and redistribution analysis
Consider rst the case where U is imposed alone. The following proposition, which follows
directly from Proposition 1, states the implications of U in terms of welfare.
Lemma 3 (Restricted-entry regulation, USO=U, welfare analysis) The welfare un-
der the restricted-entry regulation and with the ubiquity constraint is given by
W
U
re(t) = max(f WEI(t);WII):
The function W U
re is nonincreasing and continuous with respect to the tax level t.
More precisely, it is strictly decreasing in the taxation regime and then constant in the
cross-subsidy regime.
Consider now the case where both constraints are imposed together (UND). We have
the following lemma.
Lemma 4 (Restricted-entry regulation, USO=UND, welfare analysis) The wel-





f WEI if f WEI  WII    ~ SE
WII if f WEI  WII    ~ SE:
The function W UND
re is non increasing with respect to t and discontinuous at t = UND.
16This result is also present in Anton and alii [1]
14A consequence of this proposition is that the tax level which maximizes the welfare (that
is, the rst best tax), in the case where the taxation regime exists, i.e. when WEI > WII;
is tFB = 0: In the cross-subsidy regime, the welfare is constant with respect to the tax rate.
However, for this level tFB of the tax rate, rm I incurs a decit. Therefore it is interesting
to examine what happens for the tax level tBB that guarantees the budget balance of rm
I: e I(tBB) = 0: This is done in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume SE < 0;SI < 0 and SI < SE or WII < WEI: The prot of the
incumbent in the benchmark case is I = 0: Then, whatever the USOs at work:
 Competitive neutrality and budget balance are equivalent.
 The taxation regime exists for small values of t and the rst best tax is tFB = 0: This
rst best tax implies a decit for the incumbent: e I(0) = SI < 0:
 If SI +SI = e I(te)  0; that is, when the monopoly of I is viable, then there exists
at least a competitively neutral tax.
When t = tBB the welfare is f WEI = 

~ SE + tBB~ qE

+ SI + k in the taxation regime,
whereas in the case where I cross-subsidizes, it is WII: In the benchmark case, it is equal
to WE0 = SE +k: Clearly the comparison with the benchmark depends on the value of
k.
The last point of Proposition 3 follows from the continuity of the prot function e I
with respect to t. Since e I(0) < 0 and e I(te) > 0, there exists at least a solution to the
equation e I(t) = 0.
Remark 4 Suppose now SI > SE (and still SE < 0;SI < 0).
 The prot of rm I in the benchmark case is: I = (SI   SE) > 0. Therefore,
competitive neutrality implies budget balance for the rm I.
 If USO = U, the cross-subsidy regime prevails for all t. The welfare does not depend
on the tax level.
 If USO = UND, the taxation regime occurs when t < UND if SE > SI.
 In both cases, if SE + SI  0; then there exists a competitively neutral tax.
At this stage, we can discuss the social benets and costs of the USO's.
Assume for instance that SE < SI (and still SI; SE < 0): Then, in the benchmark case,
rm I serves the low cost consumers and high costs consumers are not served; the welfare
is then WI0. If UND is imposed, then the welfare is given by the above proposition. In
the taxation regime (see point 3 of the above remark), the variation of welfare with regard
to the benchmark case can be written as:
W
UND = f WEI   WI0 =  k +   SI + (~ SE + t~ qE   SE) + (SE   SI):
15The rst term, which is positive, represents the gain, in terms of social welfare, due to
the connection of the high costs consumers. The other terms are negative. The term   SI
represents the cost associated with the connection of these consumers. The third term
represents the loss in allocative eciency (distortion of the surplus due to the taxation).
The last term represents the productive ineciency, due to the fact that the most ecient
rm for serving these consumers, that is, rm I is replaced by rm E (less ecient).
The choice of a tax level has also important consequences in terms of redistribution.
We now compare the benets obtained by the various classes of consumers accross the
various possible regimes.
Suppose rst that UND is at work. If the tax rate t leads to the regime where I
cross-subsidizes, then both types of consumers obtain a positive surplus uI =  uI = ~ SE > 0,
which depends on t. As Gasmi et alii (1999) pointed out, cross-subsidization corresponds
to implicit taxation and has important redistributional eects.
In the taxation regime, where the tax is perceived, all consumers have uE =  uI = 0.
Therefore, the choice between cross-subsidies or taxation regime raises an equity issue,
that has to be solved by political choices and not only through ex-ante criteria, such as
competitive neutrality.
Suppose now USO=U. In the taxation regime, the sharing of the surplus between 
consumers and E cannot be determined. However, they have uI = ~ SE in the cross-subsidies
regime and uE  ~ SE in the taxation regime. High costs consumers are indierent, as what-
ever the regime, they have  uI = 0. The ubiquity constraint generates no redistributional
eect between consumers. However, both consumers are better in the ICS regime.
4 Pay or Play: the entrant may serve high cost con-
sumers
In this section, we investigate the alternative allocation rule where the entrant may choose
to serve the non protable users instead of paying the tax. As in the previous section we
consider separately the eects of U and of UND.
4.1 The ubiquity constraint under the pay or play rule
We rst compute the equilibria of the pay or play game and thereafter examine its welfare
properties.
4.1.1 Equilibria of the competition process
The rst important result shows that the prot of rm I coincides again with that of the
regulator and that the social objective can thus be decentralized. But compared to the
restricted-entry regulation, the pay or play regulation allows to achieve another regime
16where rm E serves all the consumers (the ECS regime) and nances its decit on high
costs consumers through cross-subsidies. Let pop be the value of the tax for which


SE   ~ SE

+ SE = 0
that is, ~ SE = WEE   k: If t is lower than this threshold, then E has no incentive to
serve the non protable users whereas if it is higher, E can protably serve both classes
by cross-subsidization.
The proposition and the corollary below are proved in appendix (section A.3).
Proposition 4 (POP regulation, USO=U) Under the pay or play regulation, when
only the ubiquity constraint is at work, the ECS regime may appear only for t > pop. The
prot of the incumbent is given (up to a constant) by
e I =
(
max(WII;f WEI) if t  pop
max(WII;f WEI;WEE) if t > pop:
Therefore the prot is identical, up to a constant, to the welfare in the corresponding regime.
As in the restricted-entry regulation, the choice of the regime by rm I is thus that of
the regulator (for a given level of the tax) who can thus decentralize the social optimum.
However, the pay or play regulation now introduces, for some values of the tax rate, the
possibility that rm E serves both classes of consumers, a situation which was not achiev-
able under the restricted-entry regulation. The following lemma now gives the equilibria
of the game.
Corollary 3 (POP, USO=U, Perfect equilibria) At equilibrium of the pay or play
regulation with ubiquity constraint, two cases may appear, according to the value of the tax.
(i) When t  pop, the situation is identical to the restricted-entry regulation. The regime





re = max(f WEI;WII):
The equilibria are the same as in the restricted-entry game:
 if f WEI < WII: I cross-subsidizes (ICS), uI = ~ SE;uI = 0
 if f WEI > WII: Taxation regime (TR), uE 2 [0; ~ SE];uI = 0.
(ii) When t > pop; three regimes (ICS, TR, ECS) may occur. Then the welfare is given by
W
U
pop = max(f WEI;WII;WEE):
The equilibria are given by
17 if W U
pop = WII; I cross-subsidizes (ICS) and (uI;uI) 2 DII:
 if W U
pop = f WEI; the taxation regime occurs (TR), and (uI;uI) 2 DEI:
 if W U
pop = WEE; E cross-subsidizes (ECS) and (uI;uI) 2 DEE where
DEE =
n








(uI;uI)=uI = (SE   e SE) + SE and uI  e SE
o
.
The pay or play regulation has a number of welfare implications that are now examined
more in detail.
4.1.2 Welfare consequences of the ubiquity constraint: A comparison between
the restricted-entry and the pay or play regulations
The virtue of the pay or play regulation, compared to the restricted-entry regulation,
is that it allows, in situations where E is more ecient, to allocate the market of high
costs consumers to rm E: It results that the pay or play regulation oers an additionnal
possibility for the allocation of the users compared to the restricted-entry one. It thus
enhances productive eciency. Moreover, it is easy to check the following points:
 In the taxation regime, high costs consumers obtain u = 0 in the restricted-entry reg-
ulation, and u = 1

h
(SE   e SE) + SE
i
> 0 in the pay or play regulation. Therefore
the high cost consumers prefer the pay or play regulation.
 In the regime where I cross-subsidizes, consumers   have u = 0 in the restricted-
entry regulation and a value u 2
h
0;WEE   k   e SE
i
in the pay or play regulation;
consumers  have u = e SE under the restricted-entry regulation, whereas they obtain
a value u 2
h
e SE;WEE   k
i
in the pay or play regulation. Thus both classes of
consumers benet from the pay or play regulation instead of the restricted-entry
one.
 In the regime where E cross-subsidizes, there is a multiplicity of equilibria that share
dierently the surplus between consumers and rm E:
An important consequence of the rst remark is that the pay or play regulation in-
volves redistribution between consumers, although the ND constraint is not imposed (this
redistribution does not appear in the restricted-entry regulation, under USO=U). These
remarks lead to the following proposition.
18Proposition 5 (USO=U, Welfare and utility comparison) When the ubiquity con-
straint alone is at work, the welfare and the consumers'surplus are both always at least
higher under the pay or play regulation than under the restricted-entry regulation.
We have seen that the welfare conguration depends on the comparison between three
terms: WII;WEI;WEE: More precisely, at equilibrium, the welfare exhibits the following
properties.
 If WII is the highest, then the welfare is at (constant with respect to t), the equi-
librium conguration is that where I cross-subsidizes. Whatever the value of t; the
prot of rm I is I = WII   WEE > 0: Every t is then a rst best tax.
 If WEE is the highest, then the rst best is achieved for all t > pop. For such
values of t; we have I = 0; and these tax rates verify the budget constraint and are
competitively neutral.
 If WEI is the highest, the rst best is achieved for t = 0 and for that value, the prot
of rm I is e I (0) = SI < 0: The balanced-budget tax tBB is thus a second best.
Budget balance and competitive neutrality coincide, but this (common) level of the
tax may lead to any of the possible regimes.
4.2 Ubiquity and non discrimination under pay or play regula-
tion
We now examine the case where the incumbent is tied down to a non discrimination
constraint. Firm E is allowed to serve the high costs consumers  . Since we assume
 SE < 0, it is clear that rm E never serves consumer   only. Consider the case (ECS)
where rm E serve both types of consumers. Recall that I must announce uI =  uI  0
because of the ubiquity and non discrimination constraints. It follows that, in the case
(ECS)
uE =  uE  0:
In other words, rm E has to fulll both constraints also (in case it serves  and  ).
Therefore, in that case, there is no reason for E to pay a tax when it serves both markets
and cross-subsidizes (ECS regime).
Recall that we have dened pop by
SE +   SE = ~ SE:
We introduce another threshold  , dened by
SE +   SE = ~ SE:
Since ~ SE is decreasing with respect to t, we have: pop   . As usual, the regimes at
equilibrium follow immediately from the prot function of rm I. The proposition below
(proved in appendix section A.4) gives the prot of the incumbent in the dierent regimes.
19Proposition 6 (USO=UND, POP regulation, SPE) Under the pay or play regula-





max(WII    ~ SE;f WEI) if t  pop
max(WII   [~ SE   (SE +   SE)];f WEI;WEE) if pop  t   
max(WII;WEE) if    t:
Three congurations may prevail at equilibrium, according to the level of the tax rate:
 when the tax rate is very low, it is never protable for rm E to serve both markets.
Therefore, two regimes may appear, ICS or TR, according to the value of the tax;
 for intermediate values of the tax rate, letting E cross-subsidize may appear at equi-
librium, depending on the eciency of both rms;
 when the tax rate is very high, the total amount generated by the taxation regime
is so low that this regime disappears, and the equilibrium is either ICS or ECS,
according to the respective eciency of both rms.
Note that with regard to "pure" productive eciency, the rst two congurations involve
a distortion, due to the non discrimination constraint. However, this distortion has not
the same expression in both cases. More precisely, the distortion induced by the non
discrimination constraint writes  ~ SE for t  pop (as under the restricted-entry regulation),
~ SE   (SE +   SE) for pop  t    and cancels for t   . It is easy to check that the
distortion is continuous and decreasing with respect to the tax rate.
In the following proposition (see section A.4 for the proof), we compare the welfares
under the restricted-entry and the POP regulation (for USO=UND).
Proposition 7 (USO=UND, Welfare comparison) If t  pop, the welfare is the
same in the POP regulation as in the restricted-entry regulation. If t > pop, this is






pop  t    or, equivalently, ~ SE  SE +   SE  ~ SE
WEE < WII < WEE + [~ SE   (SE +   SE)]
f WEI +  ~ SE < WII:
(2)
Then under the restricted-entry regulation, the ICS regime prevails and the welfare is WII,
while the POP regulation leads to the ECS regime, where the welfare is WEE < WII.
(ii) Suppose now

t >   or, equivalently, ~ SE  SE +   SE
f WEI > max(WEE;WII):
Then under the restricted-entry regulation, the taxation regime prevails and the welfare is
f WEI, while the POP regime leads to the regimes ECS or ICS, and thus to a lower welfare.
20Unlike what happens when the ubiquity constraint alone is at work (see Proposition
5), the welfare in the POP regulation may be strictly lower than in the restricted-entry
regulation. The loss of welfare when it appears may come from the distortion ~ SE  (SE +
  SE) due to the ND constraint (case (i) above) or to the disappearance of the taxation
regime in the POP regulation for high values of the tax level (case (ii) above).
According to Proposition 6, ex-ante criteria (competitive neutrality,...) may rule out
some socially optimal regimes. The regulator should take this into account when deter-
mining the tax level and choosing the regulation rules.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we have analysed and compared the properties of the restricted-entry regula-
tion and the pay or play regulation for allocating and funding universal service obligations
in a network market open to new competitors. Of course, other mechanisms may be imple-
mented to ll these universal service obligations both on the allocation and on the funding
sides. We now briey mention two alternative regulatory frameworks : lump sum transfers
and second-price auctions.
5.1 Lump sum transfers
In this paper, we have concentrated here on the mechanisms that are nanced through
taxation. Losses associated with serving the high costs consumers could also be funded
through lump sum transfers levied on tax payers.
Suppose for instance USO=U and a transfer T is used to fund the USO17. We briey
describe the situation in case the entrant is not allowed to serve high costs consumers. The
prot of the incumbent is
I =

(SI   SE) +   SI + T if I serves  and  
  SI + T if E serves  and I serves  :
The welfares in the dierent regimes are
W T
II = SI +   SI + k + T   (1 + )T = WII   T
W T
EI = SE +   SI + k + T   (1 + )T = WEI   T;
where  denotes the cost of transfer of public funds (a transfer equal to T thus generates a
dead weight loss equal to T). The prot of the incumbent is given, up to a constant, by
I = max(WII;WEI):
Recall that with the unit tax, we had e I = max(WII;f WEI) (see Proposition 1). Funding
the ubiquity constraint through lump sum transfers thus guarantees "pure" productive
eciency.
17Remark that in such a case, the distortion on demand disappears.
21Now suppose that the regulator chooses a second-best criterion and denes the transfer




max( (SI   SE)     SI;0) when WII > WEI
   SI when WEI > WII:
Note that T BB  0. The comparison between the regulation modes depends on the value
of tBB;T BB and  and is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 (USO=U, restricted-entry regulation, taxation v.s. transfers) Funding
the ubiquity constraint through taxation is better than through lump sum transfers if
 T BB > 0, when WII > WEI;
 max(f WEI(tBB);WII) > W T
EI(T BB) = WEI   T BB, when WEI > WII.
In the rst case (WII > WEI), both taxation and lump sum transfers lead to the ICS
regime. The welfare is WII with the taxation rule and WII   T BB  WII with the lump
sum transfer. Funding USOs through taxation is thus strictly better than through lump
sum transfers if T BB > 0, that is, if
(SI   SE) +   SI < 0:
This condition expresses the fact that the incumbent makes losses when it serves both
markets, facing the competitive pressure of the entrant. Moreover, the taxation rule pro-
vides the regulator with a tool to share the surplus between the incumbent's prot and
the consumers' surplus: the tax rate inuences the potential competitive pressure ~ SE (and
does not modify the welfare WII). By contrast, with lump sum transfers, the regulator
lacks such instruments to implement the sharing of the global surplus between agents.
Suppose now that productive eciency requires that low costs consumers are served
by the entrant (WEI > WII). We know that this market structure cannot be implemented
by the tax if tBB is too high, that is if f WEI(tBB) < WII. In that case, nancing this USO
through lump sum transfers is optimal if WEI   T BB > WII.
5.2 Second-price auctions
Concerning the allocation of the USOs, regulators often use second price auctions (see for
example [1]): in such a mechanism, the ubiquity constraint may be sold to the competitors
through an auction mechanism. Each competitor bids for a subsidy for serving the  
consumers. The rm that requires the lowest subsidy wins the auctions (i.e. serves the
market). Assume that this auction mechanism is nanced through transfers. Then the
government transfers to the winning rm the value required by the other rm to serve the
high cost consumers.
22Clearly, at equilibrium of this auction mechanism, each rm K requires a transfer equal
to its loss  
 SK
 , the most ecient rm on the market of  consumers (i.e. the rm K for




 where K0 is the other rm.
The comparison between auction and pay or play depends crucially on whether the
auction mechanism allows cross-subsidization (no subsidy is perceived if the rm serves
both consumers, see Anton et alii, 1999).
Assume that cross-subsidization is not allowed. Suppose for instance that the taxation
regime prevails under the pay or play regulation. Then the welfare is f WEI; whereas with
a second price auction it is WEI   
 SE
  where I is the winner of the auction. The
comparison thus depends on the values of  and of the taxes: the second price auction
dominates the pay or play regulation if
WEI   f WEI

 SE
  > ;
that is, if  is not too high.
5.3 Concluding remarks
This paper is a rst attempt to characterize the regulation systems from a welfare and a
distributional point of view. However, we have only considered here the case of geographical
dierences between users. But users can also dier in their demand function, due either
to various preferences for the network good or to the dispersion of their revenues. Light
users (low income agents) can then be disadvantaged (or even excluded from the network)
compared to heavy ones, because of the competition on the latter market. Another goal of
the regulator could then be to protect the interests of light users. This requires to take into
account a more complex structure of demand and another form of USO. We will examine
this problem in a future paper.
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24A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
The function ~ SE is a supremum of ane functions, therefore it is a convex function. By














To see the last point, take  t = w0(0) cE, where cE > C0
E(q;) for all q (the marginal cost
C0
E(q;) is assumed to be bounded). Then the function
w(q)   CE(q;)    tq
is decreasing for q  0. Therefore, it attains its maximum at q = 0 and ~ SE( t) =
 CE(0;)  0. The continuity of ~ SE gives the existence of te such that: ~ SE(te) = 0.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2 and Lemma 2
We consider the restricted-entry regulation, with USO=UND. Recall that the incumbent




~ SE   uI taxation regime:
Firm E chooses to serve  if and only if uI < ~ SE. Therefore the announcement of uI
determines the regime that will prevail: uI < ~ SE leads to the taxation regime, uI > ~ SE
leads to the ICS regime. Firm I's prot function is then given by
e I =

SI +   SI   uI if uI > ~ SE ICS regime
t~ qE +  ( SI   uI) if uI < ~ SE taxation regime
Then the choice of the incumbent reduces to the choice of the regime: in the taxation
regime, rm I's prot is maximum for uI = 0 (unique equilibrium); in the ICS regime,
rm I's optimal announcement is of course uI = ~ SE. Then rm I has to compare the
corresponding values of its prot. We have:
e I = max

SI +   SI   ~ SE;t~ qE +   SI

:
The prot e I can be written as
e I = max

WII   k   ~ SE    ~ SE;f WEI   k   ~ SE

;
which gives Proposition 2 and Lemma 2.
25A.3 Proof of Proposition 4 and Lemma 3
We consider the POP regulation, with USO=U. Recall that the incumbent announces two






(~ SE   uI) taxation regime
(SE   uI) +  ( SE    uI) ECS regime.
Firm E prefers ECS to TR if and only if
  uI  SE +   SE   ~ SE:
The preceeding inequality is possible only if
~ SE  SE +   SE
or, equivalently, t  pop. Therefore, if t < pop, the ECS regime cannot occur and the
POP regulation leads to the same equilibria as the restricted-entry regulation.
For t  pop, the three regimes may appear, according to the value uI;  uI:
uI +   uI  SE +   SE and u  ~ SE =) ICS
  uI  SE +   SE   ~ SE and uI  ~ SE =) TR
  uI  SE +   SE   ~ SE and uI +   uI  SE +   SE =) ECS:





(SI   uI) +  ( SI    uI) ICS regime
t~ qE +  ( SI    uI) taxation regime
0 ECS regime.
In the ICS regime, it is optimal for the incumbent to announce uI;  uI such that uI +
 uI = SE +   SE. In the taxation regime, it is optimal for I to announce  uI such that
  uI = SE +   SE  ~ SE. In the ECS regime, all the possible values of (uI;  uI) lead to the
same prot, namely e I = 0. Finally rm I's prot is
e I = max

SI +   SI   SE     SE;t~ qE +   SI   [SE +   SE   ~ SE];0

;
which can be written as
e I = max

WII   WEE;f WEI   WEE;WEE   WEE

:
26A.4 Proof of Proposition 6
We consider the POP regulation with USO=UND. Recall that the incumbent announces






(~ SE   uI) taxation regime
SE +   SE   uI ECS regime.
Firm E prefers ECS to TR if and only if
 uI  SE +   SE   ~ SE;
which is possible only if
~ SE  SE +   SE
or, equivalently, t  pop. Therefore, if t < pop, the ECS regime cannot occur and the
POP regulation leads to the same equilibria as the restricted-entry regulation.
For pop  t   , we have:
0  uI  [SE +   SE   ~ SE]=  =) ECS
(SE +   SE   ~ SE)=   uI  ~ SE =) TR
~ SE  uI =) ICS





SI +   SI   uI ICS regime
t~ qE +  ( SI   uI) taxation regime
0 ECS regime.
The optimal announcement leading to TR is of course uI = [SE +   SE  ~ SE]=  and the
optimal announcement leading to ICS is uI = ~ SE. This gives the prots
e I = max

SI +   SI   ~ SE; t~ qE +  SI   (SE +   SE   ~ SE);0

;
which can be written
e I = max

WII   [~ SE   SE     SE]   WEE;f WEI   WEE;WEE   WEE

:
For    t, we have:
0  uI  SE +   SE =) ECS
SE +   SE  uI =) ICS.
The optimal announcement in ICS is of course SE +   SE, which gives the prot
e I = max
 
SI +   SI   SE     SE;0

;
which can be written
e I = max(WII   WEE;WEE   WEE):
27A.5 Proof of Proposition 7
(i) We rst show that for each (SE;  SE) there exists (SE;  SI) such that the conditions (2)
are satised. The third inequality of (2) is obtained by taking SI large enough. Now we
can choose  SI to ensure the second condition of (2).
Since f WEI < WII    ~ SE, the restricted-entry regulation leads to ICS regime. By using
assumptions (2), we obtain
WEE > WII   [~ SE   (SE +   SE)] > WII    ~ SE > f WEI:
It follows that the POP regulation leads to ECS regime (see Proposition 6).
(ii) The proof is straightforward.
A.6 Imposing ND alone under the restricted-entry regulation
In this section, we assume:  SE < 0 <  SI. The incumbent can protably serve the high cost
consumers. We assume that the regulator imposes only the non discrimination constraint
and that rm E cannot serve   (restricted-entry regulation). Firm E cannot be constrained
by ND, since it never serves consumer  . Firm I is compensated for the constraint ND by
a tax t.
Lemma 5 (Perfect Equilibria in the restricted-entry game, USO=ND) We make
the following assumptions
 SE < 0 <  SI
SI >   SI + SE
 SI < ~ SE:
Then there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which rm I serves only  (giving
them uI = ~ SE),   consumers being then excluded from the market.
Although I would serve both types of consumers in the benchmark case, imposing ND
alone has the counterveiling eect of excluding high costs consumers from the market: rm
I prefers to disconnect (or not to connect) these consumers rather than incurring losses due
to cross-subsidization between both classes of consumers. This should lead the regulator
to impose both constraints simultaneously.
Proof of Lemma 5
The possible regimes are ICS, TR and the exclusion regime, where  is served by I and





(~ SE   u) taxation regime
0 ICS regime
0 exclusion regime (rm I);





 ( SI    uI) + t~ qE taxation regime
 SI +   SI   u ICS regime
(SI   u) exclusion regime (rm I);
The optimal announcement in the taxation regime and in the exclusion regime is of course
~ SE. Therefore rm I maximizes
e I = max[  SI + t~ qE; SI +   SI   ~ SE;(SI   ~ SE)]:
The assumptions of the lemma ensure that the maximum is (SI   ~ SE) (exclusion regime).
29